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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Petitioner, (OSI), by and through its counsel, hereby 
responds to the answering brief of the Utah State Tax Commission 
(Commission) in regard to the Commission's arguments that the 
Commission has a statutory grant of interpretive discretion to 
deny the benefit of the sales and use tax exemption (20) for 
sprays to OSI, even though OSI is indisputably using a liquid 
nitrogen spray to control diseases for the commercial production 
of meat patties, an animal product. However, it will be shown 
herein that to arrive at its conclusion, the Commission has 
wholly ignored certain relevant discussions in and the holdings 
of applicable cases, has omitted material and controlling facts, 
and has distorted the wording of exemption (20). 
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EXEMPTION PROVISION (20) 
The sales and use tax exemption (20) at issue herein states 
as follows: 
§59-12-104. Exemptions. 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes 
imposed by this chapter: 
. . . 
(20) spravs and insecticides used to control insects, 
diseases, and weeds for commercial production of fruits, 
vegetables, feeds, seeds, and animal products; (Underlining 
added.) 
. . . 
THE COMMISSION'S ARGUMENTS 
The Commission's brief principally relies on two arguments 
to deny the benefit to OSI of the sales tax exemption (20) for 
sprays used in commercial production of animal products as 
follows: 
(1) The Commission had express or implied 
interpretive discretion granted by the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, (UAPA) , Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-l to 22, and by 
one provision of the Sales and Use Tax Act, (SUTA) , Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-118, to determine the meaning of the exemption for 
sprays under an "abuse of discretion" standard and not a 
"correction of error" standard as relied on by OSI; and 
(2) The Commission properly used such discretionary 
interpretive power to limit the exemption for sprays used in the 
commercial production of animal products to pesticides and 
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herbicides utilized during the "growing end" period of 
agricultural production. 
It will be shown herein that the Commissions 
arguments do not accurately state the law and fail to consider 
controlling facts. 
OSI'S REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. THERE HAS BEEN NO GRANT OF INTERPRETIVE DISCRETION TO 
THE COMMISSION IN REFERENCE TO THE EXEMPTION FOR SPRAYS. 
In regard the Commission's first argument that it was 
granted statuary interpretive discretion by UAPA and the SUTA to 
limit exemption (20) to sprays used during the "growing end" in 
traditional agricultural production, the Commission cites the 
SUTA section 59-12-118, as being the grant of such express or 
implied interpretive discretion. Also, the Commission relies on 
Putvin v. Utah State Tax Commission, 837 P.2d 589 (Utah App. 
1992), wherein this court stated that "the legislature has 
granted the Commission discretion in administration of the tax 
code generally", and the Commission argues that such statement 
is confirmation that the Commission has been granted statutory 
interpretive discretion. 
The Commissions argument essentially has no merit because 
the power to administer the SUTA does not automatically include 
statutory discretionary interpretive power. In fact, both this 
court and the supreme court have repeatedly discussed the scope 
of UAPA and the SUTA and neither court has recognized such a 
broad discretionary interpretive power as claimed by the 
Commission, but instead, has in each case examined and 
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principally relied on the specific wording and statutory context 
as well as the legislative history of the particular statutory 
provision at issue to determine whether or not a discretionary 
grant was expressly or implicitly given to the agency. Even in 
Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), relied on 
extensively by the Commission in this case, the supreme court 
determined whether there was a grant of interpretive discretion 
not by the general grant of power to administer the SUTA but on 
whether there was a separate explicit or implicit grant of 
interpretive deference given to the Commission in the language 
of the particular provision or in the statutory context which 
undoubtedly includes both the legislative history and a 
comparison of the particular exemption with the other exemption 
provisions contained in the SUTA. The legislative history of 
exemption (20) which fully supports OSI's claim of exemption is 
reviewed and discussed on pages 22-25 of OSI's opening brief. 
In a very recent decision by this court, King v. The 
Industrial Commission, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33,37 (Utah App. 1993) 
filed on March 18, 1993, Judge Billings discussed the 
application of UAPA to determine the appropriate standard of 
review in regard to agency decisions, as follows: 
. . . This model applies in all UAPA cases dealing with 
either the interpretation or application of agency-
specific law by an agency. First, we determine whether 
the legislature explicitly granted deference to the 
agency to interpret or apply statutory language at issue. 
As Judge Bench has rightly noted, we can find an explicit 
grant of deference in specific statutory language 
directing the agency to define a statutory term by 
regulation. Additionally, a statute directing the agency 
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to interpret or apply specific statutory language should 
be interpreted as an explicit grant of discretion. If we 
find such a grant, we review under section 63-46b-
16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. That is, we afford 
the agency some deference and assess whether its action 
is within the bounds of reasonableness. 
Second, if we do not find an explicit grant of 
discretion, we examine the language of the statute and 
the statutory framework for an implicit grant of 
discretion. If the statutory language is broad and 
expansive or subject to numerous interpretations we will 
assume the legislature has chosen to defer to the policy 
making expertise of the agency and we will find an 
implicit grant of discretion and review the action under 
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. If, 
on the other hand, the language is unambiguous and we can 
interpret and apply the statutory language by the 
traditional methods of statutory construction, utilizing 
our own expertise to divine the legislative intent, we 
review the agency action under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
for correction of error. (Footnote omitted.) 
In an even more recent decision by the supreme court, 
Semeco Industries, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State 
Tax Commission. 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 73 (Utah 1993), filed April 
1, 1993, Justice Durham, dissenting to the resolution of the 
case, also reviewed in general the application of UAPA to 
determine the standard of review regarding agency decisions, and 
in her discussion she cited many cases involving UAPA. Justice 
Durham stated that subsection (4)(d) of UAPA section 63-46b-16 
relating to the erroneous interpretation or application of law 
by the agency is subject to a correction of error standard, that 
subsection (4)(g) relating to fact determination by the agency 
but not supported by substantial evidence is subject to an 
intermediate deference standard, and that subsection (4)(h) 
relating to abuse of discretion or other inconsistent or 
arbitrary actions by the agency is subject to a reasonableness 
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and rationality review. See 209 Utah Adv. Rep. @ 75-78. 
Even where there are differing emphases or approaches to 
determine the appropriate standard of review in the various 
appellate decisions involving UAPA and the SUTA, it is 
undisputed that in cases where no explicit grant of discretion 
has been given, the controlling factors in every decision are 
the wording of the specific exemption provision at issue, its 
comparison with other exemption provisions in the SUTA, and its 
legislative history. 
It is submitted that under the reasoning of the various 
cases (also as extensively discussed in OSI's opening brief on 
pages 12-14) there has been no statutory interpretive discretion 
granted to the Commission in regard to exemption (20) for 
sprays. Therefore, the Commission's final decision in this 
case is subject to a correction of error standard under UAPA. 
In addition, the Commission ignores undisputed and 
stipulated facts regarding OSI's spraying of liquid nitrogen to 
control disease carrying bacteria such as E. coli, salmonella 
and staphylococcus. Therefore the Commission's final decision 
is at best arbitrary or capricious and is not supported by 
substantial evidence, even if it is to be reviewed, as Justice 
Durham suggests, only for reasonableness and rationality under 
subsection 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) which may possibly be the 
appropriate standard where the Commission's decision is for any 
reason whatever "otherwise arbitrary or capricious." See Nos. 
15, 18, 21 and 22 of the Facts in OSI's opening brief showing 
the relevant items which the Commission has ignored in its 
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argument. 
II. THE COMMISSION'S ARGUMENT THAT IT PROPERLY EMPLOYED 
ITS INTERPRETIVE POWER TO LIMIT EXEMPTION (20) ONLY TO 
PESTICIDES AND HERBICIDES USED DURING THE "GROWING END" OF 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IS BOTH ILLOGICAL AND NONSENSICAL. 
In OSI's opening brief, the association of the words of 
exemption (20) and its legislative history were extensively 
discussed in an effort to eliminate any doubt as to its fair 
application to the liquid nitrogen spray. However, there was 
one aspect of OSI's discussion, relating to the various stages 
in the food production chain, which needs to be expanded and 
examined in greater detail herein because of the Commission's 
argument that its denial of the exemption to OSI is based on 
"common sense." 
Exemption (20) applies to — 
sprays and insecticides used to control insects, 
diseases, and weeds for commercial production of 
fruits, vegetables, feeds, seeds, and animal 
products: (Underlining added.) 
It is clear from the wording of exemption (20) that, at 
least for some of the items mentioned therein, there are at 
least two stages contemplated therein and both of which are 
necessary to complete production of the particular item prior 
to consumption by humans. For example, butter, as an "animal 
product", is produced after the milk is separated from the 
cow. Likewise, pasteurization of milk, formulation of ice 
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cream, production of leather, fur and wool, as well as meat, 
all come into particular form and identity after separation 
from or slaughter of the animal. In addition, it cannot be 
disputed that the preparation and production of fruits and 
vegetables for ultimate human consumption are often involved 
in a second production stage in which canning or freezing is 
utilized prior to delivery for public consumption. The 
Commission's argument wrongly ignores the second stage of 
production which is implicit in exemption (20). 
In fact, it is common knowledge that the second stage in 
the meat food chain, involving commercial production, is 
almost never performed by farmers, as such, but is almost 
exclusively performed by entities such as OSI. Moreover, 
because the legislature used the words "commercial production" 
in exemption (20) rather than the words "agricultural 
production", it may reasonably be concluded that the 
legislature placed more weight on the second stage than on the 
first stage involving the live animals or plants. The 
Commission's emphasis on the "growing end" is clearly wrong. 
As discussed in Point I above, the Commission was not 
granted interpretive deference in regard to exemption (20). 
Nonetheless, the Commission repeatedly states in its brief 
that its argument and final decision denying the exemption to 
OSI are based on "common sense", (as defined by the 
Commission), and should therefore be adopted by this court. 
The Commission urges that exemption (20) is limited to 
pesticides and herbicides applied to the "growing end" as 
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distinguished from the "consumption end" of food production. 
On page 9 of its brief the Commission states as follows: 
Common sense would limit the application of the 
exemption to the "growing" end of food production, not 
the "consumption" end. Basically, the liquid nitrogen 
used by the Petitioner freezes the processed food as hard 
as a brick so that it can be stored, shipped, and stored 
again before it is finally grilled for a McDonald's 
customer. Certainly, no error was committed in finding 
this process outside the intentions of the exemption. 
It can be easily demonstrated that the Commission's 
"growing" versus "consumption" test used to deny the exemption 
to OSI is wholly without merit as such test is applied to the 
liquid nitrogen spray. First, it is undisputed that meat is 
an animal product as is shown by the discussion of and 
reference to the Commission's own rule on page 16 of OSI's 
opening brief. In addition, legal counsel for the Commission 
acknowledged to the Commission's hearing officer that the meat 
processed by OSI was an animal product. (See Fact No. 22 on 
page 9 of OSI's opening brief.) 
Second, as a practical matter, meat, as an animal 
product, begins its existence no earlier than the time the 
live animal is slaughtered, and thus meat cannot logically be 
considered as an "animal product" prior to that time. Third, 
it is manifest that beginning at the time of the slaughter of 
the whole animal, the "growing end" of production has been 
abruptly and fully terminated. Therefore, the entire 
commercial production of meat when it exists as an animal 
product only occurs after the "growing end" is over. 
Moreover, exemption (20) does not exempt "animals" but only 
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exempts "animal products" resulting from "commercial 
production." 
Fourth, it is apparent that the food chain involving meat 
consists of three general stages, i.e., the growing stage of 
live animals, the commercial production stage wherein the 
particular meat items (such as OSI/s patties) are produced, 
and finally the third stage wherein the meat items are 
consumed. It is undisputed that OSI is only operating in the 
second or commercial production stage and not in the "consumer 
end" stage as argued by the Commission. 
Fifth, the key words in exemption (20) are the 
"commercial production of . . . animal products." Because the 
commercial production of meat, as an animal product, can only 
occur after the live animal is slaughtered, and during the 
production of meat patties OSI administers its liquid nitrogen 
spray to control diseases, such spray is manifestly within the 
exemption. Thus, the Commission's attempt to distinguish the 
"growing end" from the "consumption end" (which "end" is not 
even implicitly within the wording of exemption (20)) is at 
best meaningless because it ignores the commercial production 
stage, the only stage in which OSI is involved. 
In addition, the Commission's arguments wholly fail to 
consider the undisputed fact that OSI's production of meat 
patties is considered by the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) as part of its jurisdiction because OSI is 
continually monitored by USDA inspectors. (See fact No. 14 in 
OSI's opening brief and OSI's Laboratory Technician Job 
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Description and HACCP plan, Exhibits 3 and 4, copies of which 
are in the Addendum in OSI's opening brief and which are part 
of the stipulated facts.) It should be noted that OSI's HACCP 
plan (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point system) was 
formulated under the guidelines of USDA's Food Safety and 
Inspection Service and the USDA's National Advisory Committee 
on Microbiological Criteria for Foods for the purpose of 
lessening or eliminating the threat of diseases to human 
consumers which might result from the production of 
contaminated food items. 
In regard to the Commission's argument that its decision 
is supported by the statutory construction rule of noscitur a 
sociis. that argument does not favor the Commission's 
conclusions when the multiple stages implicit in exemption 
(20) are considered and in fact ignores the clear differences 
between animal products and fruits and vegetables in regard to 
"commercial production." Furthermore, the Commission does not 
respond to OSI's analysis of noscitur a sociis on page 26 of 
OSI's opening brief. 
Also in support of its argument that exemption (20) 
should be read to limit its application to the "growing end" 
of "agricultural production", the Commission cites a case from 
Delaware, Burpulis v. Director of Revenue, 498 A.2d 1082 (Del. 
1985), which case involved a claimed deduction for a two-
earner married couple and which case raised an issue whether a 
prior written Delaware tax ruling on such deductions had been 
properly enacted. Although the Burpulis case is clearly 
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inapplicable, the Commission relies on Burpulis for the 
argument that a statute should not be literally interpreted if 
such interpretation would lead to "unjust and mischievous 
consequences", which injustice and mischief, the Commission 
implies, would result in this case if OSI were to be exempt 
from tax. The Commission's argument itself appears somewhat 
mischievous because exemption (20) does not yield the 
interpretation which the Commission argues for without 
inappropriately adding to or replacing the exemption's actual 
words "commercial production of . . . animal products." 
Moreover, the Commission's argument is at best contradictory, 
because in substance, the Commission is conceding that the 
plain meaning of exemption (20) would result in exempting 
OSI's liquid nitrogen spray, but then to avoid that unwelcome 
result, the Commission attempts to replace the actual words of 
exemption (20) with more restrictive words of the Commission's 
own choosing. 
The Commission also argues that the liquid nitrogen spray 
is only used to prevent "natural decay" or "mere spoilage" and 
not "diseases." The Commission's argument is contrary to 
stipulated fact number 18, that the spray is applied to 
control disease and disease producing pathogens and to the 
fact that OSI's process is monitored by USDA and is used to 
control disease carrying bacteria as stated in fact number 21 
and verified by exhibits 3 and 4 admitted into evidence. 
Additionally, the Commission's counsel conceded that OSI's 
spray was used "to control, limit disease." (R. 56) 
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Moreover, the Commission has attempted to create a 
patently false distinction between (a) "an external force such 
as infection," and (b) what the Commission characterizes, 
without definition, as mere "spoilage" and "natural decay." 
In both instances, the identically same process is being 
described. Yet, each of these descriptions by the Commission 
employs different words that deceptively characterize that 
destructive process so as to give the appearance that a 
distinction exists when, in fact, none does. A bacterium, 
virus or other microorganism is an "external force" that 
invades organic matter and causes the degradation or 
destruction of the cells of that matter. The organic matter, 
whether a vegetable, fruit or animal product, provides a 
growth medium and food source for the miscroorganism, which 
without interruption by an intervening or neutralizing agent, 
such as OSI/s liquid nitrogen spray, will grow and spread 
until the entire organic matter has been detrimentally 
affected. 
To the general public, this process may be commonly 
described more simply by many names, including disease, 
spoilage, the growth of mold or fungus, and infection. 
Regardless of the label, however, the same destructive process 
is at issue, and such process "implies an external force." 
Accordingly, as the Commission does not dispute that E. coli, 
staphylococcus and salmonella — the identified bacteria 
guarded against and neutralized or destroyed by OSI's use of 
the liquid nitrogen spray — are "external forces" that cause 
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disease, OSI's liquid nitrogen spray is exempt even under the 
Commission's reasoning. 
CONCLUSION 
Because there is no express or implicit statutory 
interpretive discretion granted to the Commission in regard to 
exemption (20) for sprays, the Commission's final decision 
should be reviewed under a correction of error standard. 
It is clear that exemption (20) exempts the commercial 
production of meat as an animal product and such production 
can only occur during the second stage after separation of the 
meat from the whole animal. It is also clear that OSI is 
involved only in the commercial production stage wherein the 
liquid nitrogen is sprayed to control diseases. Thus, OSI's 
production of meat patties is indisputably within the clear 
wording and intent of exemption (20). 
The commission's final decision should be reversed and 
the Commission should be ordered to refund to OSI the amount 
of taxes, interest and penalty paid together with statutory 
interest thereon. j 
Dated this c*T —day of April 1993. 
Walter P. Faber, Jr. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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